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Abstract: This paper connects with the ongoing debate on the dark side of paradoxes and 
with the EGOS paradox subtheme call for papers on unintended paradoxes posing the 
question of how responses to paradoxical tensions by some actors give rise to unintended or 
negative consequences with negative repercussions for other actors. We report from case 
study in the Royal Danish Defence whose leadership philosophy, training and evaluation is 
based paradoxes. Our analysis shows that unintended consequences are salient, when: 1) 
paradoxes are perceived as having been delegated too far down the hierarchical line 
unaccompanied by the necessary resources to pursue a “both-and”-strategy; or 2) when a 
both-and approach has been communicated from upper level management, yet the experience 
further down the line is that the approach is in fact one-sided. In addition, a third typical 
outcome was positive unintended consequences in the form of the unexpected activation of 
paradox coping strategies by subordinates to counter unintended consequences of paradox 
coping strategies at higher hierarchical levels. Our ethnographic study points beyond our 
original focal point of managerial ‘paradox sharing’ with subordinates and superiors in 
“paradox trios” giving rise to suggestions of a “managerial paradox eco-system”-perspective 
exploring paradoxes relationally, i.e. focusing on the fact that individual actors’ paradox 
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coping strategies influence and are influence by other actors’ coping space and available 
coping strategy repertoire. We also suggest that not only inclusion and identification of 
relevant stakeholders in the managerial paradox eco-system is relevant, but also that the 




“As complexity, change and ambiguity intensify in organizations, so does the value of a 
paradox lens and both/and approaches to theory and practice.”  
                                      (Schad, Lewis, Raisch & Smith, 2016, p. 5). 
 
Organizational paradox theory (e.g., Smith, Lewis, Jarzabkowski & Langley, 
2017; Cameron & Quinn, 1988; Lewis & Smith, 2014).) is a growing and increasingly 
successful research area, not least due to its relevance in a world characterized as VUCA- 
volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (Bennett & Lemoine, 2014) and grand 
societal challenges” such climate change and migration (George, Howard-Grenville, Joshi & 
Tihanyi, 2016). Paradox theory offers a pathway for understanding organization and their 
actions in such circumstances (Bourton, Lavoie & Vogel, 2018; Lüscher, 2018; Johnson, 
2014) as well as a way of making sense of ongoing change and complexity for managers and 
other organizational actors (Nielsen, Mogensen, Bévort, Henriksen, Hjalager & Lyndgaard, 
2019). By depicting the world of contemporary organizing and management in keeping with 
the way things are rather than how we would wish they were (Johansen, 2018), paradoxical 
thinking can empower managers. At the same time, warnings of a trap of success for 
organizational paradox research have begun to surface (Cunha & Putnam, 2017), pointing to 
the need to proactively explore a diversity of perspectives (Schad, Lewis & Smith, 2019) not 
least a critical perspective zooming in on the dark sides and the (negative) unintended 
consequences of paradox navigation as a leadership strategy (van Bommel & Spicer, 2017; 
Berti & Simpson, 2019).  
We report from an ongoing mixed methods case study exploring the interaction 
between three levels of managers and their experiences of unintended consequences of 
paradox leadership in the Royal Danish Defence. The Royal Danish Defence is an interesting 
case, as this organization has been actively and explicitly working with paradox thinking and 
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theory for the past 10 years, and their leadership philosophy, leadership training and 
evaluation is based on selected core paradoxes deemed particularly relevant for the Royal 
Danish Defence. We aim to explore the consequences of “sharing of paradoxes” across 
managerial levels, and how this is experienced in practice by paradox managers.  
The paper is structured as follows: First, we position our exploration of 
unintended inter-managerial consequences of paradox leadership within paradox theory and 
the recent focus on power and unintended consequences. Second, we present our research 
design and methodology including a case presentation of the Royal Danish Defence and its 
paradox-based leadership philosophy. Third, we present the results of an ethnographic study 
observation and interaction with managers participating in paradox leadership training 
conducted by the case organization’s leadership development unit zooming in on the 
(negative as well as positive) unintended consequences of paradox leadership. The last section 
concludes on the analysis and emphasizes the importance of exploring interaction effects 
among different levels of managers and employees to realize the full potential of paradox 
thinking in practice – in both individual organizations, society and paradox research.   
 
Theoretical framing  
This short paper connects with ongoing debate on the darker aspects of paradox leadership 
and with the paradox subtheme call for papers on unintended consequences paradoxes posing 
the question of how “the dynamics of responding to paradoxical tensions by some actors give 
rise to unintended or negative consequences that may actually exacerbate tensions for others” 
(Hahn, Jarzabkowski & Knight, 2019). As a recent article on disempowerment and paradoxes 
observe: “Paradox theory tends to be “rather power-neutral” (van Bommel & Spicer 2017, p. 
156), neglecting to acknowledge “what seems paradoxical higher up appears confusing and 
absurd lower down” (Czarniawska 1997, p. 97)” (Berti & Simpson, 2019, p. 4). Tensions are 
experienced differently at different levels (Schad & Bansal, 2018), and the successful coping 
strategy of one level may exacerbate (or alleviate) tensions at other levels (Clegg, da Cunha & 
e Cunha, 2002, p. 484): “[T]he two poles of a paradox may operate at different levels in the 
organization. A given dynamic may be true of individual behavior but the opposite may apply 
at the organizational level.”  
Not only are paradoxical tensions experienced differently by different managers at different 
hierarchical levels and contexts, they also interact between levels and in this respect the aspect 
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of power in terms of resource access, mandate and competences becomes important. 
Interpretation of paradoxical tensions may differ, but the degree to which actors are equipped 
and able to choose an appropriate course of action also differs. The room to maneuver are 
unevenly distributed among hierarchical levels, and so lower level managers or non-managers 
may be confronted by paradox, but have little opportunity to cope. The individual managers’ 
coping strategies also impact their stakeholders such as for instance their subordinates or 
immediate superiors and they are in term influenced by these actors’ coping strategies. This 
begs the question of how managers experience and cope with the unintended consequences of 
their own paradox navigation and that of their subordinates and superiors.  
 
Research Design & Methodology 
Our exploration of the unintended consequences of “paradox sharing” between 
managers and their subordinates takes its point of departure in an ethnographic exploratory 
study: Participant and participating observation at the management development educational 
program of the Royal Danish Defence College, where all managers are trained in paradox 
theory and thinking with a point of departure in the leadership codex. Numerous observations 
was made by the second author, who teaches the program and also conducts 1:1-talks with 
follow-up on the participating managers’ experiences with working with paradox in practice.  
We have explored an insider-outsider research design (Louis & Bartunek, 1992), 
where the first author, who is unaffiliated with the case organization, has had the role of the 
detached outsider voice. To be able to open-endedly explore the ethnographic experiences of 
the second author, the first author has conducted interviews with the second author before, 
during and after data analysis. Three rounds of data sensemaking iterations has been carried 
out, where we explored and made sense of the field notes, teaching materials as well as 
insights from a paradox-focused 180-degree leadership evaluation scheme originally devised 
by the second author and colleagues from his team at the Royal Defence College (now 
operated by the HR function of the Royal Danish Defence).  
Both authors have held two rounds of meetings with the director of the Institute 
for Leadership and Organisation at the Royal Defence College. The director is the manager of 
the department in charge of paradox training and he was lead strategist and project manager of 
the process leading to the formulation of the current paradox-based leadership philosophy of 
the Royal Danish Defense – a topic that he also pursued in a PhD study (Holsting, 2017).  
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In addition, a number of archival sources have been supportive in allowing the first author to 
navigate the complex workings of the Royal Danish Defence as well as be able to assume a 
skeptical, yet knowledgeable outsider position of being able to not only listen, but also pose 
critical, curious questions. 
 
Unintended consequences – COVID19 
In the submitted EGOS-short paper, the original idea was to explore the findings 
of the ethnographic study further by exploring paradox coping in action. This was to (and will 
be at a later point) be carried out by conducting a qualitative analysis consisting of interviews 
and focus group interviews with three managers, their individual immediate managers and a 
group of 5 subordinates per managers (“paradox trios”). In these interviews, the experience of 
coping with paradox would be analysed with a view exploring the interrelationship between 
the individual managers’ paradox navigation and coping strategies and how this is 
experienced by managers, their subordinates and their immediate managers. We planned to 
combine these data with a quantitative analysis of 360-degree manager performance 
appraisals based on the paradox-based leadership philosophy of the Royal Danish Defence 
from trio respondents. Unfortunately, the performance appraisal cycle was put to a halt due to 
COVID and the quantitative data set we intended to gather cannot be collected until the 
autumn of 2020. Also, many of the employees and managers that we intended to interview 
was sent home or directed to other activities that their usual tasks making recruitment of 
respondents difficult or in many cases impossible leaving us with incomplete “paradox trios”. 
As a consequence, this paper will report only from the ethnographic study.  
This situation in turn has the positive effect that we can report from and leave 
room for a more detailed discussion of findings from the ethnographic study that pointed 
beyond our original focal point of managerial ‘paradox sharing’ with subordinates and 
superiors in “paradox trios” giving rise to discussion about a “paradox stakeholder 
perspective” or “managerial paradox eco-system” as well as deliberations about the 
importance of the “paradox readiness” of managerial paradox stakeholders. The EGOS 
paradox track seems a most relevant forum for making further sense of these insights as well 




Presentation of the case study organization: Paradox-based leadership philosophy in 
practice 
The Danish Defence consists of approximately 20.000 employees, 15.000 in 
uniform. In 2008, the Danish Defence implemented a new Leadership Codex with the purpose 
of creating a shared understanding of modern leadership for all employees. It builds on three 
levels: 1) Philosophy (underlying assumptions), 2) Ethics (values for good leadership), and 3) 
Norms (actual leadership behavior). Prior to the implementation of The Leadership Codex in 
the Danish Defence, there were a set of 14 principles (value statements) for good leadership 
that had existed for almost 30 years. The Leadership principles was considered to be 
inadequate to guide the leaders of the Danish Defence in the challenges that they were facing 
due to several major changes in and around the organization; e.g., going from the territorial 
defence of Denmark to an expeditionary force to be used in peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement missions abroad. The military found it selves in an increasing complexity both in 
the operating and administrative environment and at the same time were under severe pressure 
to optimize its financial management and implementation of New Public Management. 
To cope with the increasing complexity and often opposing demands, it was 
decided to implement the Leadership Codex, which builds theoretical on paradox theory in 
general and hugely inspired by Cameron and Quinn’s work on competing values framework 
(Quinn, Faerman, Thompson & McGrath, 2003). The main paradoxes arising from the 
tensions between focusing on the relations (employees) and results (performance) and from 
focusing on creating organizational stability or change. The goal was to strike a proper 
balance between the tensions, in effect a “both-and”-solution instead of an “either-or”-
solution. This decision was aligned with the implementation in 2006 of the Danish Defence 
employee annual performance review concept based on the Leadership Codex. This was 
operationalized as a set of competencies that all employees were evaluated by based on actual 
behavior and called the Norm-level of the Leadership Codex. The same concept was used to 
asses and plan each employee’s education and career progression.  
The Value-level in the Leadership Codex was developed through a combination 
of strategic policy making and an involvement of the organization through 20 representative 
focus group interviews, 176 participants in all. The interviews aimed at identifying a 
collective understanding of the leadership roles and values that constituted good leadership 
behavior in the Danish Defence. This resulted in nine leadership values that all leaders in the 
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Danish Defence are obliged to follow. In addition, it resulted in the description of a set of 
conditions that should be created to increase the likelihood of adherence/compliance. So in a 
sense, this outline placed demands on the leaders, while at the same time outlining the 
conditions the leader could demand from the organization in order to be able to implement 
these values. All leadership education programs in the Danish Defence was aligned to support 
the Leadership Codex implementation in general and at some courses the leaders were in 
detail trained to analyze and act accordingly to leadership challenges viewed as paradoxical in 
nature. This meant to view the leadership task at hand as center of gravity and balancing their 
leadership affords around this task and thereby navigating the paradox instead of trying to 
solve it. In 2017, a quantitative concept for leadership evaluation founded on the Leadership 
Codex was implemented. This means that all leaders in the Danish Military are evaluated by 
their superior, themselves and their subordinates according to the philosophy, ethics and 
norms in the Leadership Codex.  
Analysis: Unintended Consequences 
The general feedback from internal Danish Defence surveys is that the managers 
of the Danish Defence see a lot of appreciation of the paradox-based Leadership Codex at all 
levels in the organization. They do, however, also observe some unintended consequences. 
These consequences are particularly voiced in the leadership courses where students bring and 
work on their own cases. Table 1 below summarizes the central themes arising from the 
participating observation and field notes of the second author exemplified as three types of 
typical unintended consequences: 
 
------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------ 
 
 As shown in Table 1, the two of the most frequently experiences unintended 
consequences are when leadership paradoxes are pushed too far down the organization 
(exemplified by Manager 1) or when paradox leadership seems to be viewed as a sort of a 
promise to solve a problem that subsequently are not solved (exemplified by Manager 2).  
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When a paradox is pushed too far down the organization the person or group 
designated to handle the paradox find themselves in a position where they do not have the 
capacity/competencies nor the mandate/power to actually do anything about the challenges at 
hand. This often leads to frustration or even stress among the implicated participants. This 
could be in cases where the task is to step up production and at the same time reduce costs, 
e.g. train the soldiers to do more challenging task in a wider spectrum of combat scenarios but 
with less time to train them and you do not have the capacity to manage this paradox. Another 
example is when the task is to coordinate with other branches of the defence and get them to 
contribute with resources but with no authority make them do so. 
The other unintended consequence observed is when paradox leadership is used 
as a promise to solve a problem that is the result of competing demands. This could be during 
a period of organizational change where the leaders promise to focus on both the changes at 
hand but also the stability of the routines in the organization. This so the organization 
simultaneously can prepare for the tasks of tomorrow and keep the level of the present 
operations. Often the employees find themselves in situations where they do not have enough 
resources or the right competencies to make the prober changes nor continue the level of 
operations expected of them. Then they feel that their leaders have not fulfilled their promise 
of handling both criteria for success/demands. This often leads to a diminishing level of trust 
between superior and subordinates and in severe cases employees leaving the organization. 
Also apparent from Table 1, however, is that unintended consequences are not 
exclusively negative in nature (e.g., Manager 3). This suggests that although we tend to 
associate unintended consequences with negative synergies, we need to stay open to possible 
unintended upsides of sharing of paradoxes across managerial levels and with employees. 
 
Paradox sharing: From “paradox trios” to “paradox eco-systems” 
Our findings suggest that it is timely to explore paradoxes relationally, capturing 
the ways in which individual actors’ paradox coping strategies influence and are influence by 
other actors’ coping space and available coping strategy repertoire. Widening the scope 
beyond the individual managers enable us to see, how unintended consequences take place 
when different coping strategies interact. As mentioned in the methodology section of the 
paper, our study took an unexpected turn due to COVID 19, but also because some of the 
themes that surfaced in ethnographic study pointed to the fact that our initial idea of “paradox 
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trios” of a paradox system consisting of an “anchor manager” (being the focal point of the 
trio), the manager’s superiors as well as a group of subordinates were too limited. A larger 
group of stakeholders both inside and outside the case organization emerged as relevant 
stakeholders from the point of view of the individual manager’s room for maneuvering and 
coping with paradox in practice. Indeed, a larger group of stakeholders were identified as 
significant collaborators with whom paradoxes are shared and collectively coped with (or not 
coped with) – for instance external actors in the supply chain or international military partners 
or peers in horizontal arrangements internally in the organization (e.g.; matrix organizing and 
projects).  
Particularly, data from feedback sessions between paradox trainers and paradox 
managers pointed to the fact that the challenges – as well as the upsides of working with 
paradox in practice – are likely to be experienced in the in-between landscapes of individual 
paradox leadership and relevant stakeholders in the hierarchical line, laterally or crossing 
organizational boundaries, what we seek to label a “managerial paradox eco-system”. Thus, 
our data directs our attention away from individual managers (and employees to a lesser 
extent) and suggest a move towards what has been termed third stage paradox research 
exploring paradox relationally (Smith, 2019). In much the same way as Sheep, Fairhurst and 
Khazanchi (2017) has called for research that focus on the interrelationships of tensions and 
paradoxes that function as triggers, mitigators, or amplifiers of other paradoxes, we suggest 
that managerial eco-system paradox coping also involves interaction effects where different 
stakeholders’ actions may trigger, mitigate, amplify or negate the experience and room for 
maneuvering of other stakeholders. Our previous analysis have uncovered that actors may 
affect each other negatively as well as positively.  
Studying paradox in an eco-system also addresses the call for situated studies of 
paradox within organizations and their wider context, so that scholars examine paradoxes as 
emerging from organizing rather than surfacing as isolated problems to be tackled (Cunha & 
Putnam, 2019, p.102). Enhancing our knowledge about paradox stakeholders and eco-systems 
can reshape and redraw the paradoxical landscape potentially leading to a new, a presumably 
much messier and complicated map of organizational paradox than the one advanced by the 
now classical Smith & Lewis (2011). It is our assertion that a more complex understanding of 
organizational paradox is needed to bring the field closer to the organizational practice that 




“Paradox readiness” – threshold competency level for exploring paradox eco-systems? 
Not only the identification and inclusion of a larger group of stakeholders 
emerged from our analysis of the ethnographic data; the “paradox readiness” of the actors in 
the managerial eco-system also surfaced as important for the paradox coping opportunity and 
resources available to what we term the “managerial paradox ecosystem”. The readiness of 
the managerial paradox eco-system not only depends on the paradox capabilities of individual 
managers. Our ethnographic study also suggest that the system surrounding the manager and 
the actors that deal with different dimensions of the paradox are significant players with 
regard to obtaining synergies, externalities or inertia. Particularly participants’ prior 
knowledge and experience with paradoxical leadership as well as an organizational dedication 
to focusing on and confronting paradox seems relevant. With regards to such paradox 
readiness or maturity, the data from the Royal Danish Defence is a special or even radical 
case in the sense that the organization has worked proactively and explicitly with paradox on 
the individual and organizational level for more than a decade.  
Absorption and transfer rates of paradoxical thinking may vary considerably in a 
large organization such as the case organization, and as our analysis has pointed out that 
unintended consequences occur even in a matured system. Still, the organizational paradox 
capability building is at an advanced level in the case organization; paradoxical thinking and 
acting is a common framework for action and offers a shared vocabulary for collectively 
articulating and discussing paradoxical leadership: Managers, superiors and even subordinates 
- in the cases where subordinates are officers - have been trained in paradoxical thinking and 
leadership in general and the leadership philosophy of the Royal Danish Defence in particular. 
Also, the official leadership philosophy is espoused from top management supported by a 
broad range of internal communication such as training materials, missions statements and not 
least an elaborate performance management system measuring managerial performance using 
ability to live the leadership philosophy and the organizational paradoxes chosen by the Royal 
Danish Defence as a yardstick.  
The eloquence and competency level of organizational actors has made the 
experience of exploring paradox in the Royal Danish Defence special in comparison to other 
organizations, where organizational support and individual managerial competency 
development for paradoxical thinking is not as advanced. Managers may often detect and 
experience paradox as sensation of uncertainty and confusion, experiencing what Lüscher & 
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Lewis (2008) has termed “messiness”. Indeed, one of the difficulties of paradox theory 
identified in the paradox literature is that managers rarely speak of their problems as 
paradoxes (Gaim, 2018). This means that interventions and data collection must start from 
”Adam and Eve” – even the ability to be able to identify and understand paradox thinking as 
well as acquisition of the vocabulary (e.g., distinguishing paradoxes from “difficult problems” 
or challenges in general) is a difficult and for some managers insurmountable task (Sleesman, 
2019; Nielsen, Mogensen, Bevort, Henriksen, Hjalager & Lyndgaard, 2019). 
As an illustration, it was found in a recent research project involving 55 Danish 
managers from private SMEs in a series of eight action learning-interventions focused on the 
development of paradox coping competence that just getting participants past the initial 
barrier of understanding paradoxical thinking on an overall level, identifying and naming a 
paradox relevant for their individual managerial practice took extensive effort on the part of 
both facilitators and participants (Mogensen, Nielsen, Henriksen, Bevort & Vikkelsø, 2018). 
Only at the end of the six months intervention, a larger number of participants had 
familiarized themselves with the vocabulary and thinking involved in paradox theory. It is our 
assertion that the competency level found in this action learning-study is much more typical 
setting for paradox research than the development levels found in the Royal Danish Defence.  
The challenges of engaging with organizational practice and actors in paradox 
studies have caused concern among paradox scholars that paradox be reduced and tamed 
beyond recognition so as to accommodate practitioner difficulties with paradox research in 
order to be able to engage practitioners for interventions and/or data collection (Cunha & 
Putnam, 2019). One way of passing the difficult first paradox identification and paradox 
naming-threshold of managers as well as the ”the paradox reduction trap” is to investigate 
organizations and managers that are already experienced with paradox leadership. This 
creates opportunities for researchers to avoid ”taming” or even ”laming” paradoxes, when 
paradoxes are studied in their wild, natural habitat.  
Although it may be relevant to explore paradox eco-systems in a variety of 
contexts regardless of actors’ and organization’s degree of paradox maturity/readiness, it is 
our assertion that inquiries into eco-system paradox coping may necessitate access to systems 
of more matured paradox navigators – or a research design with lengthy ethnographic studies, 
participant observation and or action learning/action research design such as has been 
suggested by Fairhurst (2019).  
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At the same time, the case of the Royal Danish Defence also points to the fact 
that paradox scholars may not find virgin territory to be educated and absorbed by the 
academic discourse as more organizations adapt and implement paradoxical leadership as a 
governance and/or leadership philosophy. In more matured organizations such as the Royal 
Danish Defence, ability to acquire the paradox language of the organizations in order to 
capture what may be a more or equally advanced level of knowledge of paradox is important. 
Data collecting that does not only avoid reducing or “deparadoxifying” paradox, but also 
ascertain that informants and researchers are discussing the same issue is important to capture 
paradox in the wild as well as learning from paradox practitioners in organizations working 
strategically and explicitly with organizational paradox. Although paradox scholars lament 
the current situation of high entry barriers for organizational practitioners to our field 
complicating communication and dialogue, we may soon find fewer white spots on the map.  
 
Conclusion 
Increasing our understanding of the consequences of paradox leadership for 
different levels of managers as well as non-managerial staff is important for the advancement 
of paradox theory as well as practice. In a contemporary organization and organizing, where 
self-leadership, co-leadership and other leadership philosophies foreseeing delegating of 
responsibility and risk to lower level managers and employees is in the rise, mitigating 
negative unintended consequences as well as reaping the benefits of positive unintended 
consequences come to the fore.  
This paper has reported from an ethnographic case study on the interaction 
between managers and their experiences of unintended consequences with paradox leadership 
in the Royal Danish Defence. We have analyzed ethnographic, observational data and field 
notes on managerial experiences of unintended consequences of paradox leadership when 
interacting with subordinates and immediate superiors. We have shown that typical 
unintended consequences are salient, when: 1) paradoxes are perceived as having been 
delegated too far down the hierarchical line unaccompanied by the necessary resources or 
mandate to adequately cope in accordance with a “both-and”-strategy; or 2) when a both-and 
approach has been communicated from upper level management, yet the experience further 
down the line is that the approach is in fact one-sided. In addition, a third typical outcome was 
positive unintended consequences in the form of the unexpected activation of paradox coping 
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strategies by subordinates to counter unintended consequences of paradox coping strategies at 
higher hierarchical levels. 
Based on themes surfacing from our data, we also discuss the need for paradox 
studies to include a wider range of stakeholders in the exploration of both intended as well as 
unintended negative and positive consequences of managerial coping with paradox. Our 
ethnographic study points beyond our original focal point of managerial ‘paradox sharing’ 
with subordinates and superiors in “paradox trios” giving rise to our suggestions of a 
“paradox stakeholder perspective” or “managerial paradox eco-system”-perspective exploring 
paradoxes relationally, i.e. focusing on the fact that individual actors’ paradox coping 
strategies influence and are influence by other actors’ coping space and available coping 
strategy repertoire. We also suggest that not only inclusion and identification of relevant 
stakeholders in the managerial paradox eco-system is relevant, but also that the “paradox 
readiness” of these stakeholders plays an important role for managerial experience of and 
coping with paradox in practice.  
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Table 1: Summary and examples of unintended consequences of paradox leadership 
 
 Manager 1 Manager 2 Manager 3 
Unintended 
consequence 
The leadership is well 
aware of the paradox at 
hand but chooses to ‘push’ 
the paradox down into the 
organization leaving the 
Manger at the lower level 
with no means to cope with 
the paradox. 
Some officers feel that their profession 
is under pressure because of the shift 
from a more craft-oriented and 
experience based education to a more 
academic based education. Only the 
first part of the coping strategy, 
accreditation of the officers courses 
are implemented leaving some officers 
with the impression that paradox 
coping strategy was a promise that did 
not deliver resulting in mistrust. 
Facing a major organizational 
change and new tasks, but with 
fewer resources, a Colonel in 
the Airforce are surprised to 
learn that the implementation of 
the Leadership Codex has made 
his organization more resilient 
to the change process thereby 
meeting less resistance.   
Core paradox 
 
The (Manager) Army 
Lieutenant Colonel main 
responsibility is to train and 
prepare a unit for their next 
mission but do not have 
enough personnel to do so. 
This could be viewed as a 
Performing/Organizing 
tension according to Smith 
and Lewis (2011). 
 
Some of the Danish Officers education 
has been accredited according to 
equivalent demands for higher 
education programs in Denmark while 
at the same time undergoing huge 
budget cost thereby reducing the more 
experienced based and craft-oriented 
teaching. This could be viewed as a 
Learning/Belonging tension according 
to Smith and Lewis (2011). 
During a major organizational 
change happening over only a 
few months and with budget 
cuts at the same time the need 
for new Standard Operational 
Procedures (SOP) should be 
developed.  
This could be viewed as a 
Learning/Organizing tension 






The Manager tries to cope 
with the tension by 
pressuring his soldiers to 
work (a lot of) extra hours 
and in some cases reduce 
level of preparing, e.g., 
cancelling training 
exercises. 
The Manager tries to navigate the 
tension by removing some of the more 
craft-oriented teaching from accredited 
academic courses with the intent to 
open up new courses that can pick up 
the teaching that are removed. 
The Airforce Colonel tried to 
implement more lean 
procedures to meet the budget 
cuts and expected a high degree 
of resistance in the organization. 
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The dissatisfaction among 
the soldiers rises. The 
ability to keep the 
experienced soldiers from 
leaving and filling the 
vacant positions becomes 
increasingly difficult. 
The Manager is met with hesitation, 
resistance or even obstruction from 
teachers but eventually gets the 
changes implemented and the courses 
accredited. 
The high degree of expected 
resistance to change did not 
happen. Instead, he found that 
the shared understanding among 
his officers of the challenges as 
paradoxes made them more 
resilient and able to navigate 
conflicting demands facing 
them with “both-and”-solutions 
rather than “either-or”-solutions. 







The Army Colonel is proud 
of the unit’s work and the 
high professional standards 
they manage to reach 
during training and 
preparation, despite the 
difficult situation with lack 
of personnel. He sees no 
immediate solution to the 
challenge.  
The leader of the Manager is very 
satisfied with the result and do not 
share the teachers’ concern of the 
profession being under pressure.  
The Colonel’s superior was very 
happy and a little bit surprised 
with the fast results and almost 
no “noise” from the 
organization.  
 
 
 
